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RECENT DECISIONS
ATOMIC ENERGY LAw-AToMIC ENERGY AcT OF 1954- SUBSTANTIAL
LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT OF NucLEAR REACTORS -
In 1956 the Power Reactor Development Company received a construction
permit from the Atomic Energy Commission to build a fast breeder nu-
clear reactor1 at Lagoona Beach, thirty miles southwest of Detroit, Mich-
igan. Intervening pursuant to section 1892 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, several unions3 claimed that the health, safety, and property of their
members would be jeopardized by the operation of the reactor. Formal
hearings were held before the AEC and a final decision affirming the
issuance of a construction permit to PRDC was made by the Commission
in 1959.4 On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
held, grant of construction permit set aside and matter remanded for fur-
ther proceedings, one judge dissenting. The safety findings required for
issuance of a construction permit are identical with those required for
issuance of an operating license.5 Further, the location of a reactor near a
large population center was not authorized by the 1954 act.6 Electrical
Workers v. United States, 280 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. granted,
364 U.S. 889 (1960).
The construction permit to PRDC was issued under section 104(b)7
of the 1954 act which authorizes the Commission to encourage the con-
struction of power reactors which do not now produce competitive power
but whose operation will provide essential information leading to its
eventual development. Competitive reactors are authorized under section
103.8 Sections 1829 and 18510 establish a two-stage procedure for imple-
menting sections 103 and 104 (b). First, a construction permit must be
obtained from the Commission pursuant to section 185. After completion
I A fast breeder reactor manufactures more fissionable material than it consumes.
See Weinberg, Breeder Reactors, Scientific American, Jan. 1960, p. 82.
2 68 Stat. 955-56 (1954), 42 U.S.C. 2239 (1958).
3 The unions involved are the IME and UAW.
4 2 CCH AToMIc ENERGY L. Rn'. 17,225-29 (AEC 1959). The initial decision is con-
tained in 2 CCH AToMic ENERGY L. REP. 17,225-4 (AEC 1958).
5 Principal case at 648.
6 Principal case at 651-52. The court also held that the unions were proper parties
in interest and that the Commission's final decision was a final order within the meaning
of § 189 and therefore reviewable.
7 68 Stat. 937 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2134 (1958). A collection of the documents involved
in the granting of the construction permit in 1956 is found in the report of the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy, A Study of AEC Procedures and Organizations in the Licensing
of Reactor Facilities, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 117-155 (1957). The controversy between the
Joint Committee and the AEC which prompted the unions to intervene concerned a
controversial report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards relating to the
safety of PRDC which was kept secret by the AEC until after the construction permit was
granted. An amendment to the 1954 act, § 182 (b), requires the Advisory Committee's
report be made public before any action is taken by the Commission.
8 68 Stat. 936 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2133 (1958).
9 68 Stat. 953 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2232 (1958).
10 68 Stat. 955 (1954), 42 US.C. § 2235 (1958).
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of the facility, but before issuance of an operating license, section 182
requires a finding by the Commission that the operation of the facility will
not be inimical to the health and safety of the public. Pursuant to its
authority under section 161 (j)ll to issue supplementary regulations, the
Commission promulgated section 50.8512 which permits the Commission to
issue a construction permit if it has "reasonable assurance" that the ultimate
safety findings required for an operating license under section 182 will be
satisfied when construction is completed. The court in the principal case
held that "reasonable assurance" is not a sufficient standard of safety, be-
lieving the 1954 act to require the same safety findings to be made at the
construction permit stage as at the operating license stage. Therefore, the
PRDC construction permit issued according to the "reasonable assurance"
rule of section 50.85 was considered to have been improperly granted. The
practical effect of this holding will be substantial elimination of the time-
saving and the technological advantages obtained under section 50.35's
dovetailing of construction of nuclear reactors with research and develop-
ment.
The court relied heavily on a colloquy between Senator Humphrey
and Senator Hickenlooper concerning an amendment introduced in the
Senate by Senator Humphrey. The amendment would have added to sec-
tion 185:
"And no construction permit shall be issued by the Commission until
after the completion of the procedures established by section 182 for the
consideration of applications for licenses under this act."' 3
In the House, the amendment was introduced by Representative Holifield,
the co-author of a separate report on the 1954 act.14 This report expressed
dissatisfaction with the procedural requirements of section 185. Read in the
light of the report, the amendment clearly called for nothing more than that
the procedural safeguards applied at the construction permit stage be the same
as those specifically made applicable to the licensing procedure. However,
in the colloquy,15 Senator Humphrey stated that the purpose of the amend-
ment was to minimize the pressure on the commission for issuance of an
operating license after the commission has permitted the reactor to be con-
structed. This pressure is generated by the heavy expenditures of the ap-
plicant in constructing the reactor and the obvious "white elephant"O1
nature of a fully constructed nuclear reactor which may not be operated.
If this concern represented the sole congressional intent, the holding of the
11 68 Stat. 949 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2201 (1958).
12 10 C.F.R. § 50.35 (1959).
13 U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY
Acr OF 1954 1168 (1955) (hereinafter cited as LEGISATIVE HISTORY).
14 Id. at 871.
15 3 LEGISLATIV HISToRY 3759.
16In the principal case, the court apparently regarded the proposition that "the
economy cannot afford to invest enormous sums in the construction of an atomic reactor
that will not be operated" as a policy adopted by Congress on the basis of the colloquy.
Principal case at 650. The cost of the PR.DC reactor is approximately $45 million.
19611
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court follows. However, for purposes of determining congressional intent,
it would seem that the statements of Senator Hickenlooper, the manager
of the bill in the Senate and a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, should be entitled to more weight than those of Senator Humphrey.
Out of context, some of Senator Hickenlooper's statements, such as "a
license and a construction permit are identical," also support the court's
decision, but Senator Hickenlooper dearly stated that the provisions of
the 1954 act covering judicial review, hearings, and notice to other regula-
tory bodies at the construction permit stage made the amendment unneces-
sary. Moreover, Senator Humphrey withdrew the amendment when these
provisions were made apparent to him. Since the amendment upon which
the discussion was focused was concerned with procedures at the construc-
tion permit level, the most reasonable interpretation of Senator Hicken-
looper's statements is that he was assuring Senator Humphrey that pro-
cedural equivalence was already written into the 1954 act. If it is admitted
that Senator Hickenlooper's statements deserve the greater weight in de-
termining congressional intent, then the court was probably wrong in rea-
soning from the colloquy that Congress intended substantive equivalence
of safety findings for issuance of a construction permit and an operating
license in addition to procedural equivalence. This does not mean, of
course, that Congress did not intend that some substantive restrictions be
placed on the issuance of construction permits. The concern with pro-
cedural requirements was undoubtedly motivated not only by the desire
to protect the rights of applicants, but also by a desire to insure the en-
forcement of safeguards in the issuing of construction permits. But this does
not force the conclusion that such safeguards could not be designed by
the expert agency to fit the procedural pattern established by Congress.
The overall legislative history contains statements such as President Eisen-
hower's desire to see the rapid development of private nuclear power,17
Congress' express purpose "to encourage widespread participation in the
development and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the
maximum extent consistent with the common defense and security and
with the health and safety of the public,"' 8 and Congress' directive to the
Commission that "in issuing licenses under this subsection, the Commission
shall impose the minimum amount of such regulations and terms of li-
censes as will permit the Commission to fulfill its obligations under this
Act."'9 These elements combine to weigh against an implication that Con-
gress intended to insulate the Commission from the kind of pressure which
concerned Senator Humphrey at the expense of greatly hindering the par-
ticipation of private enterprise in the development of the industry. Even
if some substantive limitations are implied from the colloquy, because of
the practical advantages of the Commission's procedures, it is likely that the
rules of the Commission are within the scope of their expert discretion.
171 LEGisLATrVE HISRY 50-52.
18 68 Stat. 922 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2013 (1958).
19 68 Stat. 937 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2134 (1958).
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No section of the statute or any specific legislative history is cited to
support the further holding that locating a reactor near a large population
center would in itself violate the health and safety provisions of the 1954 act
because Congress did not intend large populations to be exposed to the
dangers of a reactor bum-up in the absence of "compelling reasons." 20
On the contrary, the legislative history gives some indication that Congress
understood that many reactors would be operated near metropolitan cen-
ters.2 1 Nor is the holding consistent with the basic purpose of the 1954 act
to foster progress in atomic power development by encouraging private
industrial and utility companies to enter the nuclear industry.22 Since the
cost of transmission is a significant factor in the total cost of producing
electricity, it is not economical to locate reactors far from their consumers.
This holding of the court, if allowed to stand, will substantially impair the
same private development of nuclear power which the 1954 act is intended
to stimulate.23
Martin Adelman
20 Principal case at 651-52.
212 LEGIsLAT=w HIsroRy 2220.
22 Notes 17-19 supra.
23 Although the court's holding does not distinguish between proven and advanced re-
actors, it is possible that later decisions will apply the holding in this case only to advanced
reactors.
